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Abstract: We examine a public goods game in 83 communities in northern Liberia. Women 
contributed substantially more to a small-scale development project when playing with other 
women than in mixed-gender groups, where they contributed at about the same levels as men. We 
try to explain this composition effect using a structural model, survey responses, and a second 
manipulation. Results suggest women in the all-women condition put more weight on co-
operation regardless of value of public good, fear of discovery, or desire to match others’ 
behaviour. Game players may have stronger motivation to signal public-spiritedness when primed 
to consider themselves representatives of the women of the community. 
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A substantial amount of development programming assumes that women have preferences or 
aptitudes that are more conducive to economic development. And indeed development funding is 
often channelled through women’s groups rather than through all-male or mixed-gender 
traditional and modern authorities. For example, conditional cash transfer programmes commonly 
deliver funding to female household heads, and many microcredit schemes focus on women’s 
savings groups. Programmes and reforms to increase women’s empowerment in low-income 
countries are advocated on the grounds that, in addition to simple fairness, women in political 
office will spend more on public goods or on more-needed public goods, and empowered women 
in families will lead to more investment in agricultural productivity and children’s health and 
education. Duflo (2012) reviews a growing literature assessing these and related hypotheses. Many 
studies find evidence that directing resources or political power towards women and women’s 
groups increases children’s wellbeing and public investments in clean water and (perhaps) other 
public goods.1 
In this regard the views of the development community (Gates, 2014; World Bank, 2012) often 
reflect those of the rural poor in many low-income countries. For example, it is often held that 
extra cash is more likely to be spent on alcohol and grilled meat by men, versus household needs 
or productive investment by women. Women may also be seen as more community-minded on 
average—indeed our own survey data, described below, reflects such views. 
What is not clear from these accounts, however, is whether these beliefs reflect views about the 
attitudes and behaviour of women versus men, or rather some features of women’s groups in 
particular. Also not clear is the reason for any such differences in behaviour across genders or 
gender groups. 
We examine these questions by analysing play in a public goods game in northern Liberia in which 
the gender composition of groups making collective decisions over public goods was randomly 
assigned.2 We find that women did contribute substantially more than men, though only when they 
knew that they were playing with other women. In public goods problems involving equal numbers of 
men and women, men and women contributed similar amounts, and markedly less on average than 
in the groups with only women players. 
This main finding partially supports the arguments of development practitioners who seek to 
engage communities through women-only groups. It does not provide clear evidence in favour of 
the assumption that women are per se more community-minded when asked to make decisions 
between private and social goods (though of course this could be the case for particular public 
goods in particular settings). 
                                                 
1 Duflo cautions, however, that for economic development, women’s empowerment ‘is not the magic bullet it is 
sometimes made out to be’ (2012: 76), stressing that women face so many constraints that any multiplier effects of 
alleviating any one may be limited or absent, and that women’s empowerment can yield improvement in some 
dimensions at the expense of others. 




It is one thing to find that in a particular context all-female groups generate more collective action, 
and another to explain why. In the second part of the paper we use Bayesian methods, data from 
surveys of game players, and knowledge of a multiplier on contributions that was randomly varied 
across players, to estimate a simple structural model of individual decisions about how much to 
contribute. The goal is to gain insight into how the motivations of the women acting in the all-
women groups differed from those of men and women in the mixed groups. 
The model and data allow us to estimate the weight that people in our sample put on four different 
underlying motivations, or preferences, that could factor into different contribution decisions: 
1. the value the individual places on the expected use of the total amount of money raised; 
2. the individual’s fear of discovery of their own contribution and thus possible sanctioning; 
3. the individual’s concern with matching what others do; and 
4. the intrinsic value (or cost) the individual has for contributing, including both opportunity 
costs for the money donated and any positive value for signalling ‘community spirit’ by 
contributing. 
The results suggest that women in the all-women groups had stronger intrinsic motivation to 
contribute than both women and men in the mixed groups. That is, they would have contributed 
a substantial share of their endowment irrespective of beliefs about what it would be spent on, 
fear of discovery, or desire to match others’ contribution levels. 
These patterns are consistent with field observations suggesting that women in the all-women 
communities may have contributed more in order to signal that the women of their community 
have powerful community spirit. Thus a sense of group solidarity and implicit competition—a 
social-identity effect—may have favoured collective action. If this is correct, it would suggest a 
mechanism that might favour channelling development aid through women-only groups in some 
contexts, but not necessarily others. 
In Section 2 we describe the context of our study and provide a description of the experiment. In 
Section 3 we provide the basic results, showing differences in behaviour between gender groups 
and the effects of group composition. Section 4 compares our results with the most closely related 
results in the literature, found in Greig and Bohnet (2009). Section 5 explores mechanisms more 
thoroughly, using a simple structural model to assess the role of intrinsic incentives and three types 
of instrumental incentives, relating to conformity concerns and concerns over sanctioning. While 
all three of these appear to play a role, the differences in intrinsic incentives between conditions 
appear most salient. In the concluding Section 6 we speculate, based on the results presented and 
additional field observations, about possible reasons for the main finding. We suggest that the 
evidence for strong intrinsic motivation to contribute is consistent with the hypothesis that many 
game players thought they were signalling community quality to potential donors. Women in the 
all-women groups may have been more strongly motivated in this way due to a social-identity 
effect—a sense that they were playing for, or representing, ‘team women’ of the village. 
2 A public goods game in post-conflict Liberia 
We examine differences in the effects of the gender composition of groups by analysing play in a 




As described in Fearon et al. (2015), we used a public goods game to assess the effects of a 
community-driven reconstruction (CDR) programme implemented between 2006 and 2008 in 83 
communities in two districts in northern Liberia, Voinjama and Zorzor. Funded by the UK’s 
Department for International Development and implemented by the International Rescue 
Committee, the programme sought to foster reconciliation and improve local-level governance in 
the wake of a long civil war that ended in 2003, and that was particularly intense in these districts. 
Secondarily, the implementers and funders hoped that the funds provided would have positive 
economic effects. The primary goal of the intervention, however, was institution building to 
improve the collective action capacities of post-conflict communities. 
Based on the popular model of ‘community-driven development’ (Mansuri and Rao 2012), CDR 
works by giving communities power in selecting how the offered aid will be used, and also in 
governing the implementation and management of projects that result. The ‘catch’ is that 
communities are required to construct and use donor-specified institutions for choosing and 
managing the projects. In particular, under aid agency guidance the communities elect community 
development committees (CDCs) in open elections that (at least in this case) exclude the main 
traditional leaders (chiefs). The CDCs then deliberate and hold town meetings to decide on how 
the development funds provided will be spent, subject to some parameters given by the aid 
agency.3 
The public goods games, implemented in 2008 after the CDR interventions were (almost entirely) 
completed, were our primary measurement strategy for estimating whether the CDR programme 
had a causal impact on treated communities’ ability to generate collective action after a devastating 
civil war. The games presented treated and control communities with a small-scale challenge of 
organizing to raise funds that we would match at an average rate of 250 per cent, for a project 
chosen entirely by the community in whatever manner they decided. Described to the communities 
as a ‘small-scale development project’ in which they could obtain matching funds depending on 
how much they raised from contributions made during the game, the measurement strategy was 
intended to approximate the kind of real-world collective-action problem communities had faced 
in the CDR programme (which also required matching contributions), or indeed any community 
collective problem. 
The basic protocol was as follows: we held a community meeting in each of the 83 villages, 
announcing that a public goods game would be played the following week to determine how much 
financing would be provided to a community for use in any way the community desired. Attendees 
of the meeting were told that 24 households would be randomly selected and then a randomly 
chosen adult from each of those households would receive a sum of money (300 Liberian dollars, 
LD, or about US$5). The game player could then decide, in private, how much of this to keep and 
how much to contribute towards a public good. It was explained that after the game had been 
played, we would hold another public meeting to open the private contributions and then add our 
‘matching’ contributions on top, according to a multiplier known in advance to each game player 
and identified on the envelope. The total amount raised would then be given to three ‘community 
                                                 
3 In our case, projects had to be for community-wide rather than private or narrowly targeted benefit, and purchase 
of capital equipment for income-generating projects (such as a rice mill) was not allowed. The projects chosen tended 
to involve construction of community facilities, such as community meeting houses and guest houses (approximately 
35 per cent), latrines (30 per cent), and hand-dug wells (15 per cent). A few projects (less than 5 per cent) focused on 
school or health clinic construction; almost none were in agriculture, skills training and small business development, 
and other income-generating activities. The median value of total grants was about US$13,000 for a community, the 
specific amount depending on the community’s size and their proposals. 
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representatives’ who could be selected by the village in any manner they wished in the week 
between the first community meeting and game day.  
Notice that communities knew that in the week between the initial meeting and game day, they (or 
their leaders, or whoever) had time to decide how the funding would be used and could engage in 
mobilization activities around participation in the game. They did not know which individuals 
would be picked to play and so could not lobby or pressure specific people.4 
When we implemented the public goods game we included two variations that would allow us to 
assess differences in play between men and women, as well as the effects of group composition. 
The first variation, similar to that employed by Greig and Bohnet (2009), was that in half the 
communities we sampled 24 women to play the game and in half we sampled 12 men and 12 
women. As a result we have data on the individual contributions of 504 men and 504 women in 
42 communities who played knowing that other game players were 11 of the same gender and 12 
of the other gender, and of 971 women in 41 communities who played knowing that all 23 other 
game players were women.  
The second variation is in the multiplier applied to contributions. Within each village/gender block 
half the players had their contributions increased by a factor of two and the other half had theirs 
increased by a factor of five. Below, we use this variation to seek to assess the role of other-
regarding preferences in contribution decisions. 
In addition to the games data we also gathered data from a survey implemented immediately after 
a player made their private contribution choice. From this survey we constructed a set of measures 
used in the analysis that follows. 
Our focus in this paper is on the main effect of the gender composition treatment, the difference 
between contribution levels in the 42 ‘mixed’ communities where 12 men and 12 women played 
the game, and the 41 ‘all-women’ communities where 24 women were selected to play. This gender 
composition treatment was assigned by us at random, orthogonally to the CDR treatment 
assignments. We should note that due to low power, we were not able to have a treatment arm of 
villages in which only men were selected to play the game, which limits our ability to draw some 
inferences, as discussed below. 
3 Basic results 
The raw game data, broken down by gender and treatment condition, is shown in Figure 1. We 
see that women in the mixed condition give about the same as men—indeed slightly less. But they 
give considerably more in the women-only condition. This latter effect can be interpreted causally 
as the effect of gender composition on women’s contributions. 
  
                                                 
4 For greater detail on the development intervention and the public goods game, see Fearon et al. (2015). 
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Figure 1: Contributions by treatment/gender group 
 
 
Source: Authors’ own construction. 
Table 1 shows these results with estimation of treatment effects implemented at the village level, 
taking account of randomization blocks, including status with respect to the CDR intervention 
(see Fearon et al. 2015 for details on the randomization), together with Neyman standard errors 
and p values generated via randomization inference for the full sample of women (Column 1) as 
well as for the urban and non-urban sub-populations. We see a large and strongly statistically 
significant treatment effect: 30 LD is approximately 70 per cent of one standard deviation of the 
variation in average individual contributions in the mixed communities, and it is almost twice the 
size of the average effect of getting the 400 per cent interest rate versus the 100 per cent rate. 
Table 1: Effects of composition 
 All In quarters Outside quarters 
Mixed villages 218.55 182.15 240.86 
Homogeneous villages 248.62 232.91 252.61 
Difference (average treatment effect) 30.06 50.75 11.75 
N 82 28 54 
p (ri) 0.00 0.00 0.15 
s.e. (Neyman) 9.43 13.59 11.73 
Source: Authors’ own construction. 
In the second and third columns of Table 1 we report evidence of an interesting and puzzling 
heterogeneity for which we have no confident explanation. Of the 83 communities studied, 28 (12 
assigned to all-women and 16 to mixed) were ‘quarters’ of a larger town, and thus slightly more 
urbanized than the remaining 55 villages, which were rural. Average contributions in the public 
goods game were much lower in the quarters, reflecting lower levels of organization and 
mobilization capacity (Fearon et al., 2015). But we see that the gender composition effect is much 
larger in the quarters: mixed communities in quarters generated very low contributions, whereas 
the quarters where only women played did much better. In line with our argument and 
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interpretation of the evidence on the CDR treatment effect in Fearon et al. (2015), this difference 
could result from women’s traditional organizations functioning better for mobilization in the 
quarters than the official chief and sub-chief system, which seemed less well established than in 
the rural communities. But this is speculation. 
Our goal in what follows will be to make sense of the basic pattern of substantially greater 
collective action produced in the communities where women knew that only other women were 
making contribution decisions, versus communities where both men and women played the game. 
4 Comparison with Greig and Bohnet (2009) 
Greig and Bohnet (2009) implemented a study closely related to ours which allows for the 
possibility of assessing the consistency of findings in two locations on the continent. 
Though our game was similar in many ways to the game studied in Kenya by Greig and Bohnet 
(2009), a number of important differences are worth highlighting. As summarized in Table 2, in 
the Kenya study all participants came from a single community whereas in our study communities 
were the unit of randomization. In Kenya, participants played in groups of four in a type of lab 
established at the community centre; we worked with much larger groups of 24 subjects that were 
randomly sampled from villages, with these subjects playing in their own homes. The endowments 
in the Kenya game were smaller—approx. US$0.64 rather than approx. US$5; the multiplier was 
2 whereas ours was either 2 or 5.5 Because of the different sizes of the groups, however, the private 
returns to the public investment were much smaller in our study. In the Kenya experiment the 
players were the only beneficiaries of the contribution—which could lead to a total value of less 
than US$3—whereas in Liberia the entire village (median population of about 500) could in 
principle benefit from a project worth up to US$400. Also critical is the fact that the Kenya 
experiment did not allow for pre-play communication whereas the Liberia experiment did. In total, 
Greig and Bohnet (2009) studied 270 subjects in 68 groups of four whereas we studied 1979 
subjects in 83 groups of 24 (with limited attrition). 
Table 2: Comparison of designs used in Kenya and Liberia 
 Kenya Liberia 
Communities studied One community (slum) 83 communities 
Unit of randomization Subjects 
 
Community 
Beneficiaries of public good Subjects 
 
Community 
Group-level experimental arms 3: men, women, mixed 2: women-only, mixed 












                                                 
5 In Greig and Bohnet, for every x contributed, all four members received x/2. 
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Multiplier 2 2 or 5 
 
Private return on investment 0.5 
 
< 0.083 / < 0.21 
 




Other games played Investment game No other games 
Additional treatments None Multiplier variation 
Note: The number of subjects is not exactly equal to the number of groups times the group size in either study 
because of small doubling of roles in Kenya and a small amount of attrition in one village in Liberia. 
Source: Greig and Bohnet 2009 (Kenya) and Fearon et al. 2015 (Liberia). 
A key feature of the Kenya analysis is the use of data on player expectations about the play of 
others, generated by asking subjects how much on average they expected other game players to 
play. We have similar data for Liberia, reported in Table 3, including a measure of the number of 
others that players expected to contribute nothing; the number of others they expected to 
contribute the full amount; an estimate of the expected average contribution using these numbers; 
and a measure of whether they expected men or women to contribute more, or about the same 
(recorded here as 0 for men give more, 0.5 for the same, and 1 for women give more). 
We see from Table 3 that expectations broadly tracked the compositional condition: women did 
not have higher expectations about the contributions of others than men did in the mixed 
condition, but did have higher expectations in the women-only condition. Nevertheless, women 
in both conditions reported believing that women would contribute more than men in the mixed 
condition, while men on average said they expected equal contributions by gender. These facts 
could on their own give rise to a belief in overall higher levels of contribution by others in the 
women-only condition—a feature we return to below. 
Table 3: Expectations given different treatments 
 Women-homog. Women-mixed Men-mixed 
Expected share giving 0 0.11 0.13 0.14 
Expected share giving 300 0.85 0.80 0.81 
Expected average amount given by others 273.45 258.66 254.52 
Actual average given by others 245.93 222.92 222.92 
Predict women give strictly more 0.83 0.73 0.48 
Source: Authors’ own construction. 
Table 4 uses essentially the same specification as in Greig and Bohnet (2009, table 1); there is no 
interaction term in our model because we do not have an all-male group, and we cluster standard 
errors at the group level (the level of randomization). For ease of interpretation we use women in 
mixed groups as the base condition and then look at the differences for men, and for women in 
all-female games (‘homogeneous’). The results in Column 2 use list-wise deletion for the often-
missing expectations variable; in Column 3 we impute average community values for missing 
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expectations, while controlling for missingness and allowing for different effects for units with 
missing data. We note that in this specification and later specifications that employ expectations, 
the model includes a post-treatment variable (expectations), and the other coefficients can only be 
interpreted as direct effects conditional on strong assumptions outlined in Baron and Kenny 
(1986). 
Table 4: (External) replication of table 1 (cols 1 and 2) in Greig and Bohnet (2009) 
 1 2 3 4 
Constant 220.437 (8.392)** 106.968 (20.505)** 109.919 (20.492)** 86.707 (32.737)** 
Homogeneous 25.496 (9.653)** 19.541 (10.536) 15.464 (8.68) 80.63 (4024)** 
Male 4.96 (6.916) 10.988 (9.334) 6.297 (6.88) 10.842 (35.21) 
Expectations  0.378 (0.07)** 0.379 (0.07)** 0.467 (0.117)** 
Homog. * expectations    −0.24 (0.145) 
Male * expectations    −0.017 (0.13) 
N 1979 1093 1979 1979 
Note: ** indicates p < .01. 
Source: Authors’ own construction; Greig and Bohnet 2009. 
We see some features here that are consistent with Greig and Bohnet (2009) and some differences. 
First, our constant is considerably larger (as a share of endowments) than those found in Kenya 
and more in line with, if not greater than, those found elsewhere: even the group that contributed 
the least, women in the mixed condition, gave about 220/300 = 73 per cent of their endowment. 
Thus the evidence of weak social capital from the Kenya study is not replicated here. This could 
be related to the facts that our participants were on average members of relatively small rural 
communities rather than a large urban slum, and that the communities also had a week to inform 
community members about the game and the projects. On the other hand, as noted above, 
personal returns from contributing were arguably much smaller in our setting (because diffused 
over the broader community). 
Second, as in the Kenya study we find that women give considerably less in the mixed condition 
than in the women-only condition. In Greig and Bohnet (2009) the marginal effect for women in 
the mixed condition was a drop equal to about 10 per cent of the endowment (it is not clear 
whether this effect is significant or not). We see a drop of 26 Liberian dollars (or 30 from the non-
parametric estimation in Table 1), which is also close to 10 per cent of the endowment. In addition 
we see a strong relationship between expectations and contributions, though our estimated 
coefficient is considerably lower, at close to one third compared to one half in Kenya. 
An important point of difference between the results, however, is that we do not see strong 
evidence that women contribute less than men in the mixed condition. (We are unable to assess 
whether the effects of the mixed condition are different for men and for women.) And so the 
explanation provided in Greig and Bohnet (2009) for the effect of homogeneous groups on 
women does not find clear support here. Greig and Bohnet (2009) argue that women have overly 
pessimistic expectations in the mixed conditions while men have overly optimistic expectations. 
In contrast (see Table 3), women and men have similar expectations in mixed groups—they are 
both overly optimistic—and although women expect contributions to be about 14 LD higher in 
homogeneous communities, this is nowhere near large enough to account for differences in play, 
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if the effects of expectations in Table 4 are to be believed.6 Perhaps as importantly, as seen in the 
final column, the estimated effects of expectations appear to be weaker for women (by about 50 
per cent) in homogeneous groups. 
5 Model and implications for interpreting the evidence 
If (inaccurate) differences in expectations cannot account for the effect of composition, what can? 
In Fearon et al. (2015) we found evidence that contributions were related to greater levels of 
mobilization activity in the week before the game in CDR-treated communities, although only in 
communities where both men and women could be selected to play. Mobilization does not, 
however, appear to explain why women contributed more in the women-only villages. 
In the survey, we asked if the respondent had been contacted by anyone about how to play the 
game, about the community project, or about staying home on game day, and also about whether 
they knew of other community meetings to discuss the game and whether they knew the 
community representatives’ names. Table 5 shows that the average of yes or no responses (yes 
equals 1) for these five questions is slightly greater for women in the homogeneous groups versus 
women in the mixed groups, although this difference is not statistically significant. The rates are 
about the same for women in the women-only condition as for men in mixed. Dividing the sample 
by whether the community received the CDR programme (which does appear to have affected 
mobilization activity in the mixed communities), we see that in the no-CDR, mixed-group villages 
women were markedly less mobilized than women in the no-CDR, all-women villages. However, 
in the CDR-treated villages, if anything, there is more mobilization of both genders in the mixed 
groups. So overall this factor does not seem likely to explain why contributions were higher in the 
women-only communities. 
Table 5: Reports of mobilization activity by condition and CDR treatment status, 0–1 scale 
 Women in all-women Women in mixed Men in mixed 
All 0.46 0.41 0.47 
No-CDR 0.47 0.33 0.42 
CDR 0.45 0.48 0.51 
Source: Authors’ own construction. 
Experiments are excellent for drawing inferences about what causes what, but, by itself, finding 
that X causes Y does not explain why this is. An explanation is arguably more important in social 
science settings than in, say, drug testing, since causal effects are more likely to differ across 
contexts and settings. This puts a greater premium on learning about mechanisms (which is 
arguably where the ‘science’ is in biomedical research as well). 
In what follows we develop a simple structural model of the decision to contribute that has 
parameters of interest corresponding to four different possible motivations for contributing. We 
then use a Bayesian hierarchical model to estimate these structural parameters, and finally compare 
the estimates and implications for women in the women-only villages to men and women in the 
                                                 
6 In contrast, the differences in beliefs are close to large enough in Greig and Bohnet (2009) to account for the 
differences in play, at least using their model estimates. There, the homogeneous condition was associated with a 13.5-
percentage-point increase in expectations, which translates into a 0.57 × 13.5 = 7.7-point difference in behaviour, not 
very different to the observed 9.5-point difference. 
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mixed villages. The idea is to use the structural model to help with the problem of drawing 
inferences about mechanisms from a diverse set of survey responses and the results of several 
experimental manipulations that are themselves implemented at different levels. 
We highlight that our analysis in this section is exploratory; although we set out to measure effects 
of composition on contributions we only focused on parameter estimation after seeing the core 
results. 
5.1 Model of decision making 
We assume that when deciding what contribution 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} to make, players seek to 
maximize: 
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)  =  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖  −  𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖  −  𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥�𝑖𝑖)2 + 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖  +  φ𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖  
where 𝑥𝑥�𝑖𝑖 is i’s expectation regarding the average contribution of others in the same village, 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 is i’s 
multiplier, and 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖  is the i’s perceived probability of having his or her action discovered by others. 
For simplicity we ignore the expected benefits from contributions by others (these drop out under 
the assumption of linear gains in the public good). 
Note that we assume quasilinear utility and treat the valuation of the public goods as the numeraire. 
This is captured by the absence of a coefficient on 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 . Recall that 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 is either 2 or 5 and was 
randomly assigned to i by us; 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 and 𝑥𝑥�𝑖𝑖 are empirical measures derived from the survey data. Our 
structural parameters of interest are 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖, 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖, 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 , and 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖 . 
• Parameter 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 reflects the intrinsic value of contributing to the public good. This is 
often assumed to be negative, reflecting the opportunity cost of not having the money 
for own spending, although we allow for the possibility that it is positive on net. For 
example, it can be positive if individuals feel sufficiently good about doing what they 
see as the right thing, or they see making a contribution as a signal to the community, 
to the foreign donors running the project, or even to themselves that they are ‘good 
types’ who are community-spirited.7 
• 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖  ≥  0 and 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 ≥  0 reflect conformity concerns: with 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖  = 1 a player values 
contributions equal to those of others contributing; with 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖  < 1 a player seeks to 
contribute less than others; and with 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖  > 1 she seeks to contribute more than others. 
Parameter 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 measures the weight that i puts on matching what he or she believes 
others are doing (or, more precisely, 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖  times this). 
• Parameter 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖 reflects i’s valuation of incentives arising from social rewards or 
punishments from contributions. Note that we assume that players can be concerned 
about sanctioning from the village for less-than-complete contributions and do not 
assume that sanctioning relates only to deviations from equilibrium play. 
Individuals choose between options 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} (in hundreds of Liberian dollars). For 
purposes of estimation, we will assume that the most consequential variation across individuals in 
a community is in 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖, their marginal value for contributing independent of use of the funds, or 
                                                 
7 Individual contributions were anonymous—not seen by the community—although game players were told that their 
individual contributions could be observed by the researchers at a later date. 
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desire to match or avoid punishment, relative to the other motivations. Fixing the other 
parameters, the optimal choice for individual i is increasing in 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 and can be characterized by three 
cut-points in 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 of the form 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗  =  (2𝑗𝑗 − 1)𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖  −  (2𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥�𝑖𝑖  + 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖  + 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖) for 𝑗𝑗 = 1, 2, 3. 
If 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖  <  𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖1 then i optimally would choose 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖  = 0. If 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖  ∈ (𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖1, 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖2) then 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖  = 1 is preferred; 
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖  ∈ (𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖2, 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖3) implies 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖  = 2, and 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖  = 3 if 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖  >  𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖3. 
In particular, suppose that in a village the 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖  are distributed by the cdf 𝐹𝐹, whereas the other 
parameters (𝛾𝛾, 𝜌𝜌,𝜙𝜙) depend only on gender and village-level features, including whether the group 
composition in the village is mixed or homogeneous. Then for each i we have probabilities for 
choices of 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3},𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥, where 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖0  = 𝐹𝐹(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖1) 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖1  = 𝐹𝐹(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖2)  −  𝐹𝐹(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖1) 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖2  = 𝐹𝐹(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖3)  −  𝐹𝐹(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖2) 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖3  = 1 −  𝐹𝐹(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖3). 
It follows that if we specify a distribution 𝐹𝐹 for the 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖—say, normal with mean 𝛼𝛼 and standard 
deviation 𝜎𝜎—then we can compute the likelihood of the observed choices of 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 for the 24 game 
players in a particular community. The five unknown parameters entering the likelihood 
function—and characterizing motivations to contribute—are Θ =  {α,σ, γ, ρ,ϕ}. 
For ease of reference Table 6 summarizes the meaning of each motivation or preference 
parameter, along with some estimation assumptions discussed in the next section. 
Table 6: Summary of motivation/preference parameters and estimation assumptions 
Parameter Motivation/preference Estimation assumptions 
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 i’s marginal value for contributing 
independent of use of funds, 
matching, and sanctioning 
concerns 
Varies across individuals within 
gender groups in villages; 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 is not 
estimated 
𝛼𝛼 Mean of the distribution from which 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 
is drawn 
Varies by community and potential 
condition for each gender 
𝜎𝜎 Standard deviation of the 
distribution from which 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 is drawn 
Varies by potential condition 
 
𝛾𝛾 Weight put on matching target 
contribution 𝜌𝜌𝑥𝑥�𝑖𝑖 
Varies by potential condition for 
each gender 
𝜌𝜌 Share of reported expectation 𝑥𝑥�𝑖𝑖 
that i would ideally match if no 
other motivations 
Varies by potential condition for 
each gender 
𝜙𝜙 Weight on contributing to avoid 
sanctioning/discomfort if revealed 
to have given less than 300 LD 
Varies by community and potential 
condition for each gender 
Notes: The composition treatment conditions are women-only and mixed. By ‘varies by potential condition’ we 
mean that there are distinct parameters for women for each of these two conditions. 




5.2 Empirical model 
We use a multilevel Bayesian model to estimate the key parameters, letting these be a function of 
respondent gender and treatment condition. Our model estimates the parameters in the first 
equation in Section 5.1, as a function of treatment condition, taking 𝑞𝑞 and 𝑥𝑥� as given.8 
Let 𝜃𝜃[𝑖𝑖] denote the value of the parameter 𝜃𝜃 ∈  Θ that we use to calculate the likelihood that 
person i chose the observed 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 . 
Under the assumption that 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 is not observed, the likelihood is calculated using the probability 
that an individual takes action 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖  ∈  {0, 1, 2, 3}, given by the categorical distribution with event 
probabilities 𝑤𝑤 as defined above. 
𝐿𝐿(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)  = 𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖|𝑤𝑤(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖, 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖, 𝑥𝑥�𝑖𝑖 ,𝛼𝛼[𝑖𝑖],𝜙𝜙[𝑖𝑖], 𝛾𝛾[𝑖𝑖],𝜌𝜌[𝑖𝑖],𝜎𝜎[𝑖𝑖]) 
These individual-level parameters are generated from condition- and group-level parameters as 
follows. Let 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖, 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 , and 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 denote indicator variables for being a woman player in a mixed village, 
male in a mixed village, or female in a homogeneous village, respectively, and let 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 , 𝑗𝑗 ∈
 {𝐻𝐻,𝑊𝑊,𝑀𝑀} denote condition-level parameters, described below.9 
We let 𝛼𝛼 and ∅ vary by condition and village as combinations of village-level and condition-level 
features. 
𝛼𝛼[𝑖𝑖]  = 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀  + 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝑊𝑊  + 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻  + 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣[𝑖𝑖]
𝛼𝛼  
𝜙𝜙[𝑖𝑖]  = 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝜙𝜙𝑀𝑀  + 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝜙𝜙𝑊𝑊  + 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝜙𝜙𝐻𝐻  + 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣[𝑖𝑖]
𝜙𝜙  
where 𝑣𝑣[𝑖𝑖] denotes the village to which i belongs. We assume the village-level random effects have 
distributions given by: 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝛼𝛼  ~ 𝑁𝑁(𝜇𝜇𝛼𝛼,  𝜎𝜎𝛼𝛼) and 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣
𝜙𝜙 ~ 𝑁𝑁�𝜇𝜇𝜙𝜙,𝜎𝜎𝜙𝜙�. 
Other parameters we let vary by condition only; thus for 𝜃𝜃 ∈  {𝛾𝛾,𝜌𝜌,𝜎𝜎}: 
𝜃𝜃[𝑖𝑖]  = 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃𝑀𝑀  + 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃𝑊𝑊  + 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃𝐻𝐻 
Each of these last three is constrained to be positive. In addition we constrain 𝜎𝜎𝑀𝑀  =  𝜎𝜎𝑊𝑊. We 
employ diffuse priors on all parameters and hyperparameters, given by normal (or half normal) 
distributions with mean 0 and standard deviation of 5. 
Thus we estimate different parameters for men and for women for each treatment condition: that 
is, we use the model not simply to measure parameters but also to infer the counterfactual 
parameters that would arise were women in different treatment conditions. We thus seek to assess 
whether gains due to composition may be attributed to differences in instrumental motivations 
                                                 
8 Thus in the model presented here we do not model 𝑥𝑥� as a function of treatment, though this can in principle be 
added as an additional component of the likelihood function. We note that since 𝑥𝑥� is post-treatment, treating it as 
fixed, as done here and also in Greig and Bohnet (2009), could in principle introduce post-treatment bias. 
9 We note a slight abuse of notation here since we let 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 denote person i’s value for 𝛼𝛼 as defined above, 
and 𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀,𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹 ,𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻 denote condition-level parameters. 
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deriving from expectations about the actions of others, concerns around sanctioning, or 
differences in valuations of the public good or in terms of intrinsic motivations. In addition we 
allow for considerable village-level heterogeneity, at least for parameters 𝛼𝛼 and 𝜙𝜙. 
5.3 Effects on structural parameters 
Estimated posterior means for our five structural parameters in three conditions (women-only, 
women in mixed communities, and men in mixed communities) are shown in Table 7. There are 
two sorts of comparisons of interest. First—and most relevant to our question of why higher 
contributions were made by women in the women-only groups—is the treatment effect of the 
group’s gender composition on women players. For parameter 𝜃𝜃 this is given by 𝜃𝜃𝐻𝐻  −  𝜃𝜃𝑊𝑊 in the 
fifth column. Second, within each condition we can compare the relevant weight the average 
respondent is estimated to have put on different motivations. Recall that these numbers are relative 
to the value put on money raised from the game for the community, which has been normalized 
to 1. 
Table 7: Parameter estimates 
Parameter Men (mixed) Women (mixed) Women-only Composition effect Pr > 0 
𝛼𝛼 1.03 −0.06 5.31 5.37 0.92 
𝜙𝜙 −0.16 −0.01 0.14 0.15 0.51 
𝛾𝛾 2.97 2.86 2.02 −0.84 0.04 
𝜌𝜌 0.93 0.97 0.81 −0.16 0.30 
𝜎𝜎 12.05 12.05 11.66 −0.39 0.42 
Notes: 𝜎𝜎 is constrained to be the same for men and women in the mixed condition; the final column shows the 
posterior probability that the difference between women-only and mixed conditions (for women) is positive. 
Source: Authors’ own construction. 
Consider the treatment effects on women players first. The most striking positive effect we see 
here is the difference in 𝛼𝛼 for women between conditions. From these estimates,𝛼𝛼—the village-
/condition-level mean of the distribution of 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖—is five points higher for women in the 
homogeneous community, and is, on average, positive. This means that for the typical woman in 
these groups, every 100 LD invested gives the equivalent of an intrinsic 500 LD direct positive 
return in units of the value of the total funds raised, independent of what anyone else does. With 
𝜎𝜎 around 12, approximately one third face marginal costs of contributing and two thirds marginal 
benefits (more generally, these shares depend on the village-level intercept also). In contrast, in the 
mixed group the mean for women is negative and close to 0, meaning that the typical woman gains 
no intrinsic benefits from contributing, and half face costs. 
In the typical case we observe little responsiveness to fears of sanctioning and see little difference 
across conditions. 
We see relatively large negative effects on 𝛾𝛾, however, meaning that in the gender-homogeneous 
groups women put less weight on matching what they expected others to contribute than they did 
when they knew they were playing with men. Note that in most cases 𝜌𝜌 is close to 1, though 
possibly lower in the homogeneous group condition; thus if there were no other considerations, 
both men and women in the mixed groups would have wanted to match what they thought others 
were doing, whereas women in the homogeneous condition would have wanted to undercut others 
a bit. Overall, the matching incentives pulled offers upwards whenever players were optimistic 
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about the contributions of others.10 The result of this is that women in homogeneous groups had 
a substantially weaker motivation to contribute in order to match what others were expected to do, 
but this negative effect was more than offset by the increase deriving from the greater intrinsic 
motivation to contribute that worked through 𝛼𝛼.11 
The estimates also provide a sense of the relative importance of different motivations in game 
players’ contribution decisions. For instance, in the mixed groups, on average both men and 
women have 𝛾𝛾 values around 3, which means they put about three times the weight on the 
discomfort of deviating from the expected contribution of others by 100 LD as they did on 
increasing the total contributed by 100 LD. Women in the homogeneous condition similarly put 
more weight on conformity, though not as much as in the mixed groups. The sanctioning concern 
seems to matter hardly at all relative to the other motivations in any condition. As noted, the big 
difference is in the weight put on contributing, independent of the total raised or the conformity 
concerns. The suggestion is that especially for many women in the homogeneous condition, but 
also to a smaller degree for men in the mixed groups, contributing was typically not seen as a net 
cost that they would not want to pay unless they thought that what the money raised would be 
spent on would compensate them. Rather, the results suggest that for many game players, the game 
did not have the structure either of a classical public good problem, or of a simple coordination 
game in which contributing is costly but one might do it for conformity reasons. Instead, for quite 
a few players, contributing was a dominant strategy independent of hopes for what the money 
raised would be spent on. 
6 Conclusion 
Employing a public goods game in 83 villages in northern Liberia, we use random assignment of 
gender composition of the groups of individuals making contribution decisions to estimate the 
causal effect of playing with a mixed-gender group versus a group comprising only women. We 
find that the all-women groups contributed substantially more to a community project than did 
either men or women in the communities where both genders played. This is therefore a group 
composition effect rather than a ‘women are unconditionally more community-minded’ effect. 
Women contributed more when they knew they were playing with other women, but not more 
than men in the mixed groups. 
Our main result thus supports the logic of practitioners who seek to engage communities through 
women-only groups. It does not provide clear evidence in favour of arguments or the assumption 
that women are per se more community-minded when asked to make decisions between private 
and social goods, although this might be the case for particular public goods in particular settings. 
The basic finding is similar to that of Greig and Bohnet’s (2009) lab experiment conducted in a 
Nairobi slum, where groups of four played a public goods game in different gender compositions. 
                                                 




> 0) when −2(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖  −  𝜌𝜌𝑥𝑥�)  > 0 or 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖  < 𝜌𝜌𝑥𝑥�. Note that here we consider best responses, treating expectations 
as exogenous. 
11 The negative effect arising from the drop in 𝛾𝛾 is partially compounded by the drop in 𝜌𝜌, which lowers women’s 
targets for matching. 
 
15 
They also found that women contributed more in all-women groups than in mixed sets. The 
similarity is interesting given the many differences in the set-up and context. 
Our account of why women contribute more in women-only groups differs from the explanation 
given in the Kenya experiment. In Kenya, differences appeared to result from women holding 
overly pessimistic views about the behaviour of players in mixed groups (whereas men held overly 
optimistic views). In contrast, in Liberia differences in the beliefs of men and women were slight 
and differences in expectations across conditions did not appear large enough to account for 
differences in contributions, at least when our estimated model was employed. 
Rather, our model and the data suggest that women placed great intrinsic value on contributing to 
the production of public goods when they knew that they were working collectively with other 
women. We cannot assess systematically whether this is because mobilization undertaken by 
women in advance of play was more effective at clarifying appropriate norms of behaviour, or 
extracting promises around behaviour, or whether the intrinsic motivations stemmed from greater 
solidarity within the gender groups. 
We close, however, with some speculation motivated by the model results and field observations. 
In the initial community meetings to introduce the project and game, our local collaborators12 
explained that we had two main purposes: to provide some funds for a small development project 
that the community could choose, and also to conduct research to understand better the people 
and their lives in these communities. The second reason was given as a way of explaining why we 
were employing the unusual game procedure, which was referred to both as a process of raising 
matching funds (an idea that many communities were familiar with), and as a ‘game’. (Using a local 
analogy, participants and enumerators sometimes spoke of a ‘lucky ticket’, meaning that getting 
picked to play was like winning a lottery.) 
Attendees at the initial meetings where the game was explained immediately and audibly grasped 
the conflict between private and social good posed by the decision of how much of the endowment 
to keep and how much to put in the envelope. On one occasion (at least), an attendee was heard 
to say ‘They are testing us’, meaning that his interpretation was that we wanted to learn how 
community-spirited people in their village were. Our introductory scripts emphasized that the 
decision to keep some or all of the endowment was private and that it could be justifiable to do 
so—we avoided any language clearly identifying contribution as the right choice. Nonetheless, a 
possible inference by community members would have been that if the community contributed a 
lot, they would be more likely to receive more development assistance in the future. 
If so, then game players may have had a rationale for contributing largely independent of interest 
rates, expectations about others’ contributions, or value for the community project. The act of 
contributing the whole endowment may have been understood by some or many participants as a 
signal of community spirit to outsiders thought to have access to more resources. It was evident 
that residents of these impoverished communities were desperate for ‘development’, a term they 
frequently used. This rationale could explain some part of our estimates of powerful intrinsic 
motivations to contribute.13 
                                                 
12 The Liberian non-governmental organisation NEPI (Network for Empowerment and Progressive Initiative). 
13 We note that this motivation might also bias our expectations measure upwards, contributing to the apparent ‘over-
optimism’ we observe. That is, when asked how much they thought others in the community would contribute in the 




But how, if at all, might such a rationale explain the greater contributions of women when they 
knew they were playing only with other women? This is speculative, but a possibility suggested by 
some field observations is that the motivation to signal was greater the more a player identified 
with the defined set of other game players. Understanding yourself as a representative of ‘the 
women’ of the community rather than as a random community member may increase the desire 
to signal—to the outsiders, to the rest of the community, and to yourself—that you and your 
group are made of the right material. On hearing that only women could be chosen to play the 
game, the women in the audience sometimes seemed to feel pleased and important, perhaps as if 
proud or excited to be chosen as representatives of their community. (By contrast, occasionally 
one or two men would lose interest and walk away when it was announced that only women could 
be chosen.) 
If correct, this interpretation also sheds light on the effects of the CDR programme itself. We note 
that these effects of the composition treatment are quite different to the effects on parameter 
values we estimate for the CDR treatment, using an analogous model. In models that include 
parameters for CDR effects (not reported here) we see that although both CDR and gender 
homogeneity are associated with greater contributions, parameter estimates suggest that CDR is 
associated with a drop in 𝛼𝛼 which is offset by changes in 𝛾𝛾 and 𝜌𝜌. This is consistent with an 
interpretation in which group homogeneity induces identity concerns, whereas CDR facilitates 
collective action through enhanced coordination. Though CDR is sometimes promoted as a way 
of fostering greater group identity, these results, consistent with our analysis in Fearon et al. (2015), 
suggest that it was organization and not identity that mattered. 
The speculation above is in line with a large literature and tradition, not much known or drawn on 
in the design of development interventions, of motivating collective action by appeals to subgroup 
solidarity or even competition.14 It is understandable that development practitioners, who put a 
high premium on inclusion and avoidance of conflict, would not consider trying to generate 
collective action by these means. But perhaps creative thinking might be able to harness the power 
of group identification and competition in order to generate collective action in support of 
development projects, without, or with minimal, downside risks.  
                                                 
14 It is unfortunate that with only 83 communities under study we did not have the power to include a third treatment 
of villages where only men could play the game. This might have shed light on whether we observed an ‘all-women’ 
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